Employment & Labor Law
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Kerr v. McDonald's Corp.
427 F. 3d 947
In Kerr, the issue was whether statute of limitations for filing an action under the ADEA begins to run when the complainant receives the notice of the right to sue or when the complainant has actual knowledge that the investigation of the claim has been terminated.
Here, the plaintiffs were fired from McDonalds in Oct. 2001. They filed a class action age discrimination suit against the Defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss and argued that "the complaint was time-barred because right to sue letters issued by the EEOC were dated Dec 31, 2002, but the complaint was not filed until May 15, 2003 (well over 90 days later)." Kerr at 948-949.
The plaintiffs argued that they filed their suit within the appropriate time because they did not receive the letters until Feb. 15, 2003. Kerr at 949.
Apparently, at the end of December 2005, the EEOC told the plaintiff that the investigation of her claim had finished, and there was no evidence to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Before December 30, 2005, both plaintiffs requested right-to-sue letters from the EEOC. The EEOC sent out a written confirmation of this, and asked the plaintiffs to sign and send a form back to them. Id.
Both of the EEOC's right-to-sue letters were signed by the EEOC staff and dated Dec. 31, 2002. The EEOC procedures mails them out the day they are dated or within two days. Additionally, the cases were submitted for closing on January 9, 2003. Kerr at 950.
The court held that "that Kerr and Green Smith [plaintiffs] in failing to make any inquiry regarding their late or missing letters, failed to assume the minimal responsibility or to put forth the minimal effort necessary to resolve their claims in this case." Kerr at 953.
Additionally, the court held that "their failure to receive the letters was at least in part due to lack of diligence in following up their requests. A 90-day period beginning on January 12, 2003 would en in mid April. The May 15, 2003 claims were thus untimely filed by nearly a month." Id.
The court reasoned that "statutory notification is complete only upon actual receipt of the right to sue letters." Kerr at 952 quoting Franks v. Bowan Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the court will not use that rule when the complainant has "received notice of the right to sue. Kerr at 952 quoting Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (11th Cir. 1981).
The court stated that "we have imposed minimum responsibility ...for an orderly and expeditious resolution of their claims and we have expressed concern over enabling complainants to enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory minimum meaningless." Kerr at 952 quoting Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp., 179 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court reasoned that even though the plaintiffs returned their requests for right to sue letters, the letters were mailed around January 9, 2003. Additionally, if it takes three days to arrive, the plaintiffs should have received them by January 12, 2003. Kerr at 953.
Because they still had two months to file suit, they are barred. They could have inquired about the letters, but chose not to do so. Id.
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