Total Age Discrimination Cases: 25
An employee sued her former employer for wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The district court granted summary judgment for the employer after concluding that the employer would have prevailed under a “same decision” affirmative defense (the employee would have been terminated for poor performance, absent any discrimination). On appeal, the circuit court reversed the summary judgment, holding that, based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision, “same decision” defenses are not applicable in ADEA cases. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there is a question of material fact in the record as to whether the employer discriminated against the employee. Because the employee submitted the affidavits of two co-workers in support of her claim, there was a question of material fact and the case was remanded.
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In defending an allegation of age discrimination, an employer established that it would have terminated the employee based on unsatisfactory performance and conduct problems, absent any consideration of the employees age. The employee did not challenge evidence that she would have been terminated at an earlier date unlesse two employees intervened on her behalf. She was subsequently given different responsibilities by the company’s CEO and, within the first month of receiving such responsibilities, called in sick twice without explaining why, which the CEO felt displayed bad judgment on her part. Further, it was undisputed that the employee made several errors in a project she was working on and that the the CEO was unhappy with her work in that regard. As a result, the CEO sent an e-mail to the executive administrator indicating that, unless his impression of the employee changed, he planned to fire her because she lacked adequate writing and preparation skills for the job. The employee then neglected to fix the errors despite being asked to do so by the CEO, leading to the CEO to send a second e-mail to the executive administrator indicating that he would fire her. These undisputed facts supported the court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer.
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Police officers sued the city of Hollywood, alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat., of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. A jury found for the officers on both claims. The trial court, however, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the retaliation claims and denied the city's motion for remittitur. Both sides appealed. The officers presented evidence that of nine persons qualified for promotion, only they--the two oldest--were not promoted, even though they scored higher on the qualifying list than at least four other candidates. The appellate court held this evidence was adequate to create an inference the employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion. In view of other evidence of discriminatory intent, the officers had to prove only that younger persons were promoted over them. Though the city's rebuttal evidence removed the presumption of discrimination, substantial other evidence supported the officers' claim that the determinative factor in the promotion decisions was their age, including evidence that their superiors thought they were "too old" to be promoted. Granting the city a JNOV on the retaliation claims was error, as the city did not move for directed verdicts on these claims at trial, and there was sufficient evidence to withstand such motions . As there was scant evidence of emotional injury, awards of $ 1.1 million to each officer for non-economic damages were grossly excessive; the city's motion for remittitur should have been granted under § 768.74(5), Fla. Stat.
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The plaintiff, a cocktail waitress, brought suit against her employer under the ADEA alleging that she was terminated in an effort to rid the employer of older employees and promote a more youthful image. In order to show that her termination was discriminatory, the plaintiff was required to provide evidence in one of three ways: (1) through the use of direct evidence of discriminatory intent (2) through statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination or (3) by circumstantial evidence as set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff was unable to show direct evidence or statistical proof of discrimination. Circumstantial evidence of discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that (1) she was a member of the group of persons aged forty to seventy protected by the ADEA, (2) she was subjected to adverse employment action (3) she was qualified to perform the job from which she was rejected and (4) she was replaced by a substantially younger person or similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably than her. While the plaintiff met the first three requirements, she was unable to show that she was replaced by a person substantially younger that similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably than her. Although the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination as noted above, the court continued their analysis to find that the employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff. The employer
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[Florida Civil Rights Act
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In a suit filed against the appellee for age discrimination, the court affirmed the district court
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In Kerr, the issue was whether statute of limitations for filing an action under the ADEA begins to run when the complainant receives the notice of the right to sue or when the complainant has actual knowledge that the investigation of the claim has been terminated.
Here, the plaintiffs were fired from McDonalds in Oct. 2001. They filed a class action age discrimination suit against the Defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss and argued that "the complaint was time-barred because right to sue letters issued by the EEOC were dated Dec 31, 2002, but the complaint was not filed until May 15, 2003 (well over 90 days later)." Kerr at 948-949.
The plaintiffs argued that they filed their suit within the appropriate time because they did not receive the letters until Feb. 15, 2003. Kerr at 949.
Apparently, at the end of December 2005, the EEOC told the plaintiff that the investigation of her claim had finished, and there was no evidence to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Before December 30, 2005, both plaintiffs requested right-to-sue letters from the EEOC. The EEOC sent out a written confirmation of this, and asked the plaintiffs to sign and send a form back to them. Id.
Both of the EEOC's right-to-sue letters were signed by the EEOC staff and dated Dec. 31, 2002. The EEOC procedures mails them out the day they are dated or within two days. Additionally, the cases were submitted for closing on January 9, 2003. Kerr at 950.
The court held that "that Kerr and Green Smith [plaintiffs] in failing to make any inquiry regarding their late or missing letters, failed to assume the minimal responsibility or to put forth the minimal effort necessary to resolve their claims in this case." Kerr at 953.
Additionally, the court held that "their failure to receive the letters was at least in part due to lack of diligence in following up their requests. A 90-day period beginning on January 12, 2003 would en in mid April. The May 15, 2003 claims were thus untimely filed by nearly a month." Id.
The court reasoned that "statutory notification is complete only upon actual receipt of the right to sue letters." Kerr at 952 quoting Franks v. Bowan Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the court will not use that rule when the complainant has "received notice of the right to sue. Kerr at 952 quoting Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (11th Cir. 1981).
The court stated that "we have imposed minimum responsibility ...for an orderly and expeditious resolution of their claims and we have expressed concern over enabling complainants to enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory minimum meaningless." Kerr at 952 quoting Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp., 179 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court reasoned that even though the plaintiffs returned their requests for right to sue letters, the letters were mailed around January 9, 2003. Additionally, if it takes three days to arrive, the plaintiffs should have received them by January 12, 2003. Kerr at 953.
Because they still had two months to file suit, they are barred. They could have inquired about the letters, but chose not to do so. Id.
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Where an employee has maintained a long tenure at a certain position, qualification for position can be inferred by virtue of employee
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The plaintiff obtained a verdict at her jury trial for age discrimination. Prior to trial the employer moved to exclude certain testimony about dissimilar events that were remote in time and unrelated to the decision-maker at issue; however, the trial court denied his motion, and also refused to use the employer
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The appellee was successful in her jury trial for age discrimination. Prior to trial the appellant moved to exclude certain testimony about dissimilar events that were remote in time and unrelated to the decision-maker at issue; however, the trial court denied his motion, and also refused to use the appellant
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Chappell v. Chao
17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1185a (11th Cir. October 28, 2004)
2004-10-28
AGE DISCRIMINATION
The appellant (a federal employee) filed several charges for race and age discrimination and retaliation for filing on his own behalf and for filing affidavits on behalf of others. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 11th Circuit affirmed because the federal statutes require federal employees to either combine the related employment and termination discrimination claims and pursue them in federal district court, or to appeal the termination claim to the Federal Circuit and waive the discrimination claims. Because the appellant chose to appeal to the Federal Circuit, which dismissed his claim, and because the termination claims were based on the same facts, the judgment was affirmed.
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The plaintiff alleged discrimination under the ADEA and filed a claim under FCRA, which required she file an administrative complaint before her lawsuit may be filed. The plaintiff failed to sign a box on the form allowing the form to qualify for necessary
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Employee brought suit under the ADEA alleging he was discharged because of his age and because he refused to fire an older worker. Although the immediate supervisor admitted to making age related remarks, he stated that the employee was fired for poor performance. The trial court (1) allowed evidence pertaining to the employer
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The appellant appeals the district court
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Class action suit brought against employer for age discrimination. The District Court first certified the plaintiffs as an opt-in class, but then decertified the class. When the opt-in plaintiffs sought to intervene by right and permission in the named plaintiff
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Reynolds v. Int
17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D842a (M.D. Fla. May 26, 2004)
2004-05-26
AGE DISCRIMINATION
Evidence supports that Plaintiff was terminated as a result of his inability to produce and manage documents during contract negotiations and his lack of knowledge of information technology products and computer skills.
For an employee to claim that the employee was unlawfully discharged under section 510, Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
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Present and former employees between ages of 40 and 49 sued under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that collective bargaining agreement's elimination of employer's retiree health insurance benefits program for workers then under 50 impermissibly discriminated against younger workers. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted employer's motion to dismiss, holding that the federal claim was one of reverse age discrimination, upon which no court had ever granted relief under the ADEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Sixth Circuit court held that Section 623(a)(1)'s prohibition of discrimination is so clear on its face that if Congress had meant to limit its coverage to protect only the older worker against the younger, it would have said so. Certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that the more expansive reading of Section 623(a)(1) adopted by the circuit court does not square with the natural reading of the whole provision prohibiting discrimination. If Congress had been worrying about protecting the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40. The court found that it owed no deference to the EEOC's contrary reading because Chevron deference is only called for when "the devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent." Because the regular interpretation of the provision leaves no serious question, discrimination against the relatively young is outside ADEA's protection, and thus the employer did not violate ADEA's prohibition against discrimination "because of . . . age" by eliminating health insurance benefits program for workers under 50 but retaining the program for workers over 50.
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Ms. Lemmon alleged she was discriminated against because of her age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. Ms. Lemmon argued the arbitration agreement she entered into with Lincoln was invalid and unenforceable because it was vague and did not properly set forth the claims that would be covered by the agreement so as to generally and fairly inform the employee that it covered statutory claims. The court disagreed, finding the agreement did not contain any limitation of remedies or otherwise ambiguous language that might make the agreement unenforceable. An arbitration agreement need not specifically set out each and every claim that is covered by the agreement. Secondly, Ms. Lemmon argued that no arbitration agreement between her and Lincoln existed because the two forms she signed only acknowledged that the arbitration agreement was contained in the employee handbook. Because Lincoln reserved the right to modify the handbook, the agreement was unenforceable. Again the court disagreed, holding that, even though Lincoln retained the right to alter the handbook, they could not unilaterally alter the agreement to arbitrate.
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Employee, whose position was terminated as part of reduction in force, brought suit against the employer for failing to rehire or transfer her to other positions within company in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The lower court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the employee failed to produce any evidence that she applied for a job or put her employer on notice that she was interested in a specific position. Employee appealed. The Court held that the employee's general statement, at time of her dismissal, that she was willing to take any open position within company, without submitting application for any specific job, did not impose a duty on the employer to consider her for open positions that it had publicized. The ADEA only provides that a discharged employee who applies for a job for which she is qualified and which is available at the time of her termination must be considered for that job along with all other candidates, and cannot be denied the position based upon her age. Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1996). The court further held that the employer's failure to consider employee for such positions was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA.
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JONES V. DILLARD
16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C665a (N.D. Ala. May 30, 2003)
2003-05-30
AGE DISCRIMINATION
Plaintiff worked for a department store in Alabama that Defendant purchased. Defendant continued to employ the existing workforce, however, it employed Plaintiff at the same rate of pay but in a different job because certain job titles did not exist under Defendant
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Individual plaintiffs were all employed by Blue Ribbon, a wholesale meat manufacturing processor. After learning that its largest account, Wendy
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The plaintiff was 54 years old when hired by Amsouth. The plaintiff was advised to seek other employment opportunities when questions arose as to his performance. An internal memorandum subsequently announced the hiring of a 29 year old woman with nearly the same title as the plaintiff. The plaintiff suspected age discrimination. On December 1, 1999, the plaintiff was advised to meet with human resources to set his final date of employment. Although there had been prior discussions indicating the possibility that the plaintiff might lose his job, the plaintiff asserted that he did not unequivocally understand he was being terminated until he was told to meet with human resources. The plaintiff filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 28, 2000. The appellate court found that it was error to grant patrial summary judgment to the defendant employer based on a late filing of the EEOC complaint where material issues of fact remained as to whether an unequivocal communication of termination had been effectively communicated to the plaintiff (December 1, 1999, or previously). The appellate court also affirmed the dismissal of the state law fraud claim alleging failure on the part of the employer to make remuneration in connection with a management incentive program, where the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing that the employer intended to deceive him. The appellate court also found that there had been no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to compel discovery of all word processing files created, modified and/or accessed by, or on behalf of five Amsouth employees over a two and one half year period, where such a request was overly broad and burdensome. The plaintiff also showed no reasonable showing of relevance for the requested discovery.
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Sixty year old female plaintiff alleged that her termination during a reduction in force was age based and that she had been paid differently than her male co-workers. The appellate court found that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence because the plaintiff
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Plaintiffs appealed the district court
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Plaintiff, a white female over 40, alleged that she was discriminated against in connection with her non-promotion to the position of Manager of Management Services at the Miami-Dade Transit Agency. Plaintiff further alleged that her supervisors at the Transit Agency retaliated against her after she complained about the discriminatory treatment.
The Court found that Miami-Dade proffered a non-discriminatory and legitimate reason for Plaintiff
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