Cases

After witnessing a co-worker violate federal airline regulations, an employee sent a letter documenting the incident both to her superior and to the TSA. The employee was then informed she was fired for sending the letter to the TSA, so she brought an action against her employer under the Florida Whistleblower Act. The Court granted summary judgment for the employee because her letter to the TSA constituted an “objection” to the illegal behavior and that the employer could not escape responsibility for the behavior by putting it all on the coworker.

An employee sued his former employer, a state agency, alleging several causes of action, including a violation of § 112.3187, Florida Statutes (the Public Sector Whistle-blower’s Act), where the employee claimed he was terminated for reporting what he saw as misconduct by a supervisor. The employer moved to dismiss this cause for failure to state a claim, and the court found the employer’s argument to be “vague and convoluted.” However, it refused to dismiss the cause because of what it stated was the low pleading threshold needed to state a claim. The plaintiff further alleged negligence against the employer for failure to properly supervise him and ensure that he was only terminated for cause. The court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss this claim, though, ruling that the employer owed no general or statutory duty to the plaintiff. The court also granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the former employee’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, ruling that the employer did not engage in “outrageous” conduct. However, it denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the former employee’s tortious interference claim against some individual defendants who it found who be considered third parties to the employer-employee relationship.

Two compliance inspectors were fired from their jobs at the Department of Public Works in DeKalb County, Georgia. These employees filed a complaint against their supervisors, arguing that the termintation violated the whistleblower provision of the Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. §1367(a) and violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of the supervisors, holding that 42 U.S.C. §1983, under which the inspector’s brought their complaint, does not provide for a private right of action in cases where another statute provided an appropriate remedy, here, the Clean Water Act. Further, the court rejected the inspectors’ First Amendment argument finding each spoke as government officers when they discussed sewer overflow with their supervisors, and they were not speaking as private citizens on a matter of public concern. The court held that a citizen must accept some limitations on his or her freedom of speech upon entering
government service.

A former employee filed a Florida Whistle-blower's Act claim against the city of Pompano. The trial court struck the employee's request for a jury trial. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds under § 112.3187(8)(b), Fla. Stat. The employee was demoted and then discharged when he notified authorities of alleged conditions at a water treatment plant. He appealed to an administrative board of the city. The employee's attorney inquired of the assistant city attorney whether the city had an administrative procedure for handling whistle-blower complaints so that the employee could comply with the time periods in the Florida Whistle-blower's Act. More than three months later, the city responded that the board review was not a Whistle-blower's Act administrative procedure and that if the employee withdrew his appeal, the city would consider the employee's termination as final. The employee withdrew his appeal and filed his lawsuit. On appeal, the court found that (1) the employee was entitled to argue to the fact-finder that an adverse personnel action under § 112.3187(3)(c), Fla. Stat., took place when he withdrew his appeal, and that the limitations period began to run from that date; (2) the employee was not entitled to assert equitable estoppel in response to the statute of limitations defense; and (3) the employee was entitled to a jury trial as he sought money damages under § 112.3187(9)(c), Fla. Stat.

A former employee sued a state university, alleging it violated the Florida Whistle-blower's Act, §§ 112.3187-112.31895, Fla. Stat. (2003). The trial court granted the university's motion to strike the employee's jury demand, conducted a bench trial, and entered judgment for the university. The employee appealed. The employee's complaint alleged that after she made oral reports to the administration alleging irregularities in the university's scholarship accounts, an ensuing internal investigation failed to substantiate at least some of her claims. The university then declined to renew her annual contract, which effectively terminated her employment. She sought lost wages and benefits caused by her allegedly retaliatory discharge under § 112.3187(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004), of the Act. The appellate court noted that a party seeking to invoke rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforceable in an action at law had a concomitant right to trial by jury. Because the employee sought legal relief in the form of money damages as compensation for lost wages, the trial court erred in denying her right to a jury trial under art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. That the employee also sought front pay or other equitable relief was immaterial to her right to a jury trial; since she also sued for back pay, she was not seeking purely equitable relief. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to reinstate the employee's demand for trial by jury.

A former employee sued a state university, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of Florida's public sector Whistle-Blower's Act. The employee complained about certain financial practices she observed and filed an administrative complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations under § 112.3187(1) and (7) of the Act. Shortly thereafter, the university fired her. The Commission found that it was reasonable to believe that the university retaliated against her because of her whistle-blowing disclosures. Less than 180 days after the Commission ended its investigation, the employee filed the instant lawsuit. The trial court held (1) that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to entertain a whistle-blower administrative complaint against the university because the university was not among the group of state agencies for whom the Commission had jurisdiction to entertain such a complaint; (2) that instead of filing an administrative complaint with the Commission, the employee was required to file a civil action within 180 days after the adverse personnel action; and that her failure to do so rendered her suit untimely. The appellate court disagreed. A state university was a "state agency" for purposes of chapter 216, Fla. Stat. Therefore, the university was a "state agency" under §112.3187(8)(a), Fla. Stat., of the Act, and the Commission had jurisdiction to hear the employee's complaint.