Cases

An employee brought suit against his employer to recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Upon settling the action, the parties submitted a joint stipulation for dismissal. The court rejected the stipulation, ordering the parties to submit the settlement agreement to it for approval. In FLSA actions, the court must review any settlement to ensure the compromise is fair and reasonable to the employee and did not frustrate the implementation of the FLSA. The court further noted that such an agreement could not prospectively waive the employee’s FLSA rights, must award the employee’s counsel reasonable fees, and could not contain a confidentiality agreement, which would be in contravention to the purpose of the FLSA.

An employee filed an FLSA claim for unpaid overtime against his employer. The employee agreed to settle the claim, but a magistrate judge who reviewed the settlement recommended that it be rejected and replaced with one with reduced attorney’s fees. The Court noted that it was required to approve any FLSA settlement in which the plaintiff received less than his or her initial demand. It further stated that such approval should focus mostly on the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and costs. This means that a court may deem attorney’s fees to be unreasonable even if agreed to by both sides. The Court then stated that such settlements will be approved if they (1) constitute a compromise of the plaintiff’s claims (2) fully disclose the terms of the settlement and reasons for settling and (3) represent that an attorney’s fee amount was agreed to without regard to the amount paid to the plaintiff, it will be approved. In this case, the Court ruled that the parties must amend the settlement because it lack sufficient detail on how the attorney’s fee amount was decided upon.

A group of employees brought suit against their employer for failure to pay them overtime as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and for violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss these claims for failure to state a cause of action. The Court held that the employer’s decision to classify employees as “exempt or nonexempt for FLSA purposes” was not sufficient to create a cause of action under ERISA. The employees’ record keeping argument also hinged on their classification, as they claimed that their incorrect classification led to incorrect records. Thus, it was also deemed insufficient.

The Court held that dismissal with prejudice of a claim for back wages under the FLSA may not be enforced without court approval. The defendant argued that the joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice it entered into with the plaintiff did not require approval of the district court in order to take effect. Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court concluded that although dismissing such a claim without prejudice would not require such approval, since it would not preclude the plaintiff from refiling his or her claim, dismissal with prejudice precludes such refiling, and any such agreement required court approval.

An opt-in class of 1,424 store managers, in a collective action certified by the district court, sued their employer for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The jury found that the managers were not exempt executives and awarded them over $19 million for unpaid overtime. The evidence showed that the managers, who were salaried employees, spent up to 90% of their time performing manual labor, such as unloading trucks and cleaning the employer's stores; the managers had little or no traditional managerial discretion, such as making hiring and firing decisions; and the managers worked a minimum of 52 hours per week. The court held that (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to decertify the collective action that was brought under 29 U.S.C.S. § 216(b) because the district court carefully followed the two-stage procedure for certifying a collective action, and the evidence showed that the 1,424 managers in the class were similarly situated in at least 14 key areas, regardless of store size and sales volume; (2) the executive exemption defense of 29 U.S.C.S. § 213(a)(1) did not apply because the evidence showed that the managers' primary duty was not management but consisted of manual labor; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to make a finding of willful violation under 29 U.S.C.S. § 255(a), which in turn prevented a finding of good faith that would have impacted the assessment of liquidated damages under § 216(b).

In an action for unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs, 12 current and former employees of defendant city, appealed a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the city. The suit was brought under the FLSA's collective action provision, 29 U.S.C.S. § 216(b). Each of the 12 employees worked for the city's fire and rescue department as either emergency medical technicians or rescue supervisors. Although trained in fire suppression, they almost exclusively provided emergency medical assistance. The city argued that it was not required to pay overtime wages under the exemption in 29 U.S.C.S. § 207(k) of the FLSA for employees engaged in fire protection activity, as defined in 29 U.S.C.S. § 207(y). The employees conceded that they were trained in emergency fire suppression but argued that they did not have the responsibility to engage in fire suppression as required by § 207(y). Following binding precedent, the court held that the employees were subject to the exemption regardless of whether they had ever actually engaged in fire suppression. They were equipped with fire-fighting equipment and could be ordered to fight a fire at their employer's discretion if needed and if they refused, they would be subjected to discipline. It was irrelevant that, under the city's operating procedures, the employees were unlikely to be called upon to help suppress a fire. Therefore, summary judgment was affirmed.