Cases

Ten inmates incarcerated at Florida State Prison, all of whom had serious mental illnesses, brought a §1983 case against various officers and employees of Florida's Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The inmates alleged that the used of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The inmates settled their damages claims against the individual correctional officers responsible for administering the chemical agents. The court then held a 5 day bench trial on the remaining claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the two defendants allegedly responsible for the policy which authorized the use of chemical agents on inmates at the prison. District court entered judgment in favor of two of the remaining six plaintiffs (4 had been dismissed from the suit) concluding that the repeated sprayings inmates Thomas and McKinney received violated the 8th Amendment. Those 2 plaintiffs demonstrated that they were unable to conform their behavior to prison standards due to their mental illness such that the use of force for discipline amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court permanently enjoined the defendants, in their official capacities, from allowing the non-spontaneous use of chemicals on Thomas and McKinney without first consulting with DOC's trained mental health staff to evaluate their mental health status. Defendants appealed challenging the finding of an 8th Amendment violation and the propriety of a permanent injunction. One plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal, thereby rendering the relief he obtained moot. That plaintiff may still be a prevailing party for purposes of determining attorneys' fees and costs in the district court proceeding, however. Defendants asserted district court erred in treating case as a "condition of confinement" case rather than "excessive use of force" case. Excessive use of force required that defendants act "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" while "condition of confinement" requires only that defendants act with "deliberate indifference." Although Defendants technically raised this issue before final judgment, they wanted until after the trial court entered its findings of fact using a "condition of confinement" standard to assert it. Thus, the appellate court found this "last ditch attempt" at error preservation was inadequate and untimely. The issue should have been raised before or during trial. Appellate court found there was no clear error in the lower court's factual findings that McKinney had decompensated at times when he was sprayed and afterwards and had in fact suffered objective harm as a result. The facts also established the subjective harm component that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm to McKinney. The court also found that the injunction was properly entered as there was the likelihood of irreparable harm to McKinney in the form of continued sprayings. Additionally, the scope of the relief was not too broad and unworkable. The district court's order was affirmed in all respects.

Orlando enacted a group feeding ordinance which required anyone conducting a large group feeding, such as for homeless persons, obtain a permit first. The city enacted this ordinance after getting citizen complaints that numerous homeless persons were dispersing into neighborhoods following feeding events in public parks, run by Orlando Food Not Bombs and First Vagabonds Church of God, whose congregation consisted mostly of homeless persons. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration act at §761.01, et seq.; the First Amendment's free exercise, free speech and free assembly clauses; and the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The ordinance limited the number of group feedings events that any
organization can have in a single park within the Greater Downtown Park District to two per
consecutive 12 month period. This would require the plaintiffs to rotate their events among
the parks in the district or move to a park outside of the district. The lower court granted the
city summary judgment on both the due process and equal protection claims, and r4ejected
the facial free speech claim because "the conduct regulated by the ordinance is not, on its
face, an expressive activity." After a bench trial, the court granted the City's rule 52(c)
motion for judgment on the state law claim. The court later ruled in favor of the church on
its free exercise claim and in favor of Orlando Food Not Bombs on its "as applied" free
speech claim. The court ruled in favor of the City on the plaintiffs' free assembly claims. The
court permanently enjoined the city enforcing the ordinance against plaintiffs, and the City
appealed. Plaintiffs also appealed the court's grant of summary judgment on their 14th
amendment claims and state law claim. The 11th circuit found that the conduct of feeding people in a public park was not clear enough that an objective reasonable person would understand that the feeders are trying to convey a message. Thus, the conduct of feeding people was not expressive speech for 1st Amendment purposes. Because the ordinance was neutral and served a rational basis, it also could not be said to violate the free exercise clause. The ordinance applied to all organizations who sought to feed large groups in the parks. The court also found that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague facially or as applied under the due process clause, thus it affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the city. The appellate court also held that the part of the ordinance which exempted city licenses or contracted concessionaires, lessees, or licensees did not violate the equal protection clause because there was a rational basis for the City to believe that it could more effectively regulate the vendors' conduct in parks through their licenses or contracts. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal fo the state law claim and found that the ordinance imposed no substantial burden on the church's exercise of sharing food with other pursuant to a sincerely held religious belief. Although the ordinance may impose some inconvenience by requiring the feedings be relocated outside the District, it did not forbid the Church and its members from engaging in their religious exercise.

Plaintiff a prisoner in a Florida state prison, acting pro se, brought claims alleging violations of Title II of the ADA against individual defendants in their official capacities as employees of GEO Care Group. A private prison management corporation operating a Florida state prison. The district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint finding that GEO was not a public entity, and only public entities are liable for violations of Title II. Plaintiff contended that GEO was a public entity under section 12131(1) (B) of the ADA which defines public entity, in part, as an "instrumentality of the State." The court looked to statutory interpretation and determined that "instrumentality" was akin to the other words in the statute, which were "department, agency and special purpose district." Thus, "instrumentality" had to refer to a governmental unit, which GEO was not. A private contractor does not become liable under Title II merely by contracting with the State to provide governmental service and GEO was not liable in this instance as a governmental unit. (Judge Barkett dissented).

An inmate sued two sheriff’s deputies, arguing that their deliberate indifference to her serious medical condition led her to have a miscarriage while in jail. The inmate had used crack cocaine and smoked cigarettes every day of her pregnancy before being incarcerated. The inmate began experiencing abdominal pain and vaginal bleeding in her cell, and she alleged that she and her cell-mates called for help several times over an eight hour span before being attended to. The nurse determined that there was no emergency and the inmate was returned to her cell, where her condition allegedly worsened and she ultimately had the miscarriage. The district court denied the deputies’ summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. The district court ruled that the inmate had presented evidence that the deputies violated the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. The circuit court reversed and granted summary judgment to the deputies. Though the court noted that the inmate had shown a serious medical need, it held that to establish deliberate indifference, the inmate was required to show something beyond gross negligence. The inmate had not presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the deputies knew this was an emergency situation. The deputies knew that the nurse had examined the inmate and determined that the situation was not an emergency, there was no evidence suggesting that
the inmate’s condition was so dire that the lay deputies should have known that the medical
professional nurse had misjudged the severity of the situation, and there was insufficient
evidence to constitute a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the deputies had
been advised that the inmate’s condition had worsened. Accordingly, the deputies were
entitled to qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment.

A group of protestors brought a §1983 action against the city and several police officials under a supervisory liability theory, alleging that police officers violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights during a free trade protest. The protestors alleged that they were protesting peacefully when the police forced them to disperse and herded them by using pepper spray, tear gas, batons, and bean bag guns. The city officials sought qualified immunity from the claims. The district court denied the official’s request for immunity with respect to the first amendment claims, finding that the protestors’ rights were violated when the officials failed to stop the use of weapons to disperse the crowd. The district court granted the officials immunity with respect to the fourth amendment claims, finding that although the protestors’ rights were violated by the herding, the violation was not clearly established. The officials appealed the district court’s denial of immunity with respect to the first amendment claim and the district court’s determination that the herding of the protestors was a violation of the fourth amendment (even though they were granted immunity with respect to this claim). The circuit court dismissed the appeal regarding the fourth amendment for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the officials were granted immunity and could not appeal a favorable judgment. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s denial of immunity with respect to the first amendment claim as to all of the officials, except the a Major. The circuit court held that all of the officials, except the Major, had the authority to direct the subordinate officers. By directing the subordinate officers to engage in the conduct which violated the protestors’ rights, the officials also violated the protestors’ rights.

A former employee sued the department that had employed her, alleging unlawful employment practices in violation of § 760.10. The department presented evidence suggesting that the elimination of the former employee's job was due solely to budget cuts and was not pretextual. However, the appellate court found that the evidence relied on by the former employee was susceptible to a reasonable inference that the explanation offered by the department for the elimination of the former employee's job was, indeed, pretextual. This was sufficient to present a jury issue, and to preclude summary judgment.