Employment & Labor Law
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Harrington v. The Children's Psychiatric Center, Inc.
17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 353a (S.D. Fla. December 2, 2003)
Plaintiff Harrington sued her employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act for race discrimination and retaliation. In her first charge with the EEOC, Plaintiff alleged five separate bases for racial discrimination against CPC: a denial of promotion to North Dade Unit Director; exclusion from certain meetings; change of status to "exempt" under the Fair Labor Standards Act; denial of request for a cellular phone and denial of a pay raise. Plaintiff later filed a second charge with the EEOC alleging retaliation because certain programs were taken away from her; her title was changed; and she was made to fill out time sheets. Defendant filed for summary judgment. In a direct evidence case, if the plaintiff makes a showing of direct evidence of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway absent the discriminatory motive. Plaintiff's only direct evidence was a comment allegedly made by a former Director of Human Resources. The court found this comment was inadmissible hearsay evidence under Zaber v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997). In a circumstantial evidence case, the McDonnell Douglas analysis controls. The court held that plaintiff had established her prima facie case regarding the denial of promotion. The burden then shifted to CPC to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote plaintiff. The court found that CPC met this burden by demonstrating that Lentin, the white female ultimately hired for the Dade Unit Director position, was more qualified than Plaintiff. The court further found that plaintiff was unable to show that CPC's proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination. In a failure to promote case, the plaintiff must meet her burden in proving pretext by showing he or she was substantially more qualified than the person promoted. The disparity in qualifications must be one that "jumps off the page and slaps you in the face." Here, a comparison of plaintiff's qualifications with those of Lentin showed that Lentin's managerial responsibilities and clinical qualifications were greater than those of plaintiff. As for plaintiff's remaining claims for discrimination in terms and conditions of employment, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary burden because she could not establish that she had the requisite experience to warrant attendance at certain meetings; she could not demonstrate that her reclassification under the FLSA had anything to do with race; she did not formally request a cellular phone from CPC and not all employees were provided with cellular phones by the company. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.
The court also granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action and (3) that a causal connection exists between the two. The court found that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Plaintiff alleged she was retaliated against because she made internal complaints regarding her exclusion from meetings. However, the protected activity may not include internal complaints. Also, an adverse employment action must be a serious and material change in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Plaintiff's salary, title and benefits were not altered in any way.
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